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Abstract: The human system, driven largely by economic decisions, has profoundly affected
planetary  ecosystems  as  well  as  the  energy  supplies  and  natural  resources  essential  to
economic production. The challenge of sustainability is to understand and manage the complex
interactions between human systems and the rest of nature. This conceptual article makes the
case  that  meeting  this  challenge  requires  consilience  between  the  natural  sciences,  social
sciences  and  humanities,  which  is  to  say  that  their  basic  assumptions  must  be  mutually
reinforcing  and  consistent.  This  article  reviews  the  extent  to  which  economics  is  pursuing
consilience  with  the sciences  of  human behavior,  physics  and ecology,  and the  impact  full
consilience would have on the field. The science of human behavior would force economists to
redefine what is desirable, while physics and ecology redefine what is possible. The challenges
posed by ecological degradation can be modeled as prisoner's dilemmas, best solved through
cooperation, not competition. Fortunately, science reveals that humans may be among the most
cooperative of all species. While much of the mainstream economic theory that still dominates
academic and the policy discourse continues to ignore important findings from other sciences,
several  sub-fields  of economics have made impressive strides towards consilience in recent
decades, and these are likely to change mainstream theory eventually. The question is whether
these changes can proceed rapidly enough to solve the most serious problems we currently
face.
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1. Introduction
Human impacts on the planet are now on the scale of
geological forces, to the extent that the current era is
increasingly  referred  to  as  the  anthropocene  [1].
These impacts  threaten to exceed planetary bound-
aries, risking catastrophic impacts on humans and the
rest of nature [2].  If we hope to meet fundamental
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human  needs  in  the  near  term  without  destroying
planetary life support functions required by all species,
we can no longer separate the study of human systems
and  natural  systems,  but  must  instead  adopt  a
transdisiplinary, holistic approach to science that "seeks
to  understand  the  fundamental  character  of  inter-
actions between nature and society.  Such an under-
standing  must  encompass  the  interaction  of  global
processes with the ecological and social characteristics
of  particular  places  and sectors." ([3] p.  641) Earth
Systems  Science  [4]  and  Sustainability  Science  [3]
exemplify this approach.
The steady accumulation of human knowledge has
made it impossible for any individual to be an expert in
all  areas  of  study.  Scientific  progress  therefore  has
relied on increasing specialization in narrow areas, as
exemplified by the study of individual disciplines within
the  universities.  This  specialization  has  resulted  in
impressive advances, but it  has also created barriers
between fields  of knowledge. These barriers are not
only serious obstacles to the advance of sustainability
science, but also can lead individual disciplines to build
on beliefs or assumptions that contradict those of other
disciplines. Even if specialization is necessary, it is es-
sential that facts and theories within a discipline are
internally  consistent,  and  the  facts,  theories  and
inductions  from one  discipline  do  not  fundamentally
contradict  those  from  another.  In  particular,  "when
different disciplines focus on the same object of know-
ledge, their models must be mutually reinforcing and
consistent where they overlap" ([5] p. 4). When there
is  disagreement,  it  should  be  settled  with  empirical
tests, experiments and observations to lend support to
one hypothesis over another, and not simply ignored.
This  is  very  much the  case  in  the  natural  sciences.
Theories in cell  biology do not contradict theories in
evolutionary biology, and both are consistent with the
theories of chemistry and physics. Even when facts and
theories may seem to contradict each other, as in the
case of quantum theory and the theory of  relativity,
physicists pay close attention to the contradictions, and
assume that they will eventually discover basic physical
laws that resolve them. This type of agreement across
fields  and  disciplines  is  known  as  consilience  [6].
Sustainability  science  demands  consilience  as  an
explicit objective.
Consilience is far less advanced in the social sciences
than  the  natural  sciences  [7].  Facts,  theories  and
inductions from one social science not only frequently
contradict  those  from  another,  but  also  frequently
contradict  the  natural  sciences.  The  most  important
example of this in the context of sustainability science
may be in the discipline of  economics for  two main
reasons.  First,  economic  activity—defined  as  the
transformation by humans of raw materials and energy
into  goods  and  services  intended  to  satisfy  human
wants  and  needs—is  the  central  cause  of  the  most
serious  sustainability  challenges  that  human  society
currently faces: global climate change, biodiversity loss,
land use change, ocean acidification, ozone depletion,
waste emissions in  excess of  the planet's absorption
capacity, and excessive dependence on rapidly dimin-
ishing  stocks  of  fossil  fuels.  Second,  economics
arguably has the most influence of any social science
on policy decisions. This article will focus on consilience
in  mainstream  economics,  which  has  the  greatest
impact  on  policy  decisions,  and  hence  the  greatest
influence on sustainability.
Consilience  is  not  the  occasional  incorporation  of
theories or insights from the natural sciences into the
social  sciences,  but  rather  the  explicit  acknowl-
edgement that the social sciences must be consistent
with the common understanding of fundamental laws
that the natural sciences have built up over decades
and centuries. This does not mean however that the
social  sciences  should  be  explicitly  modeled on the
natural sciences or should blindly adopt its methods.
There  are  profound  differences  between  the  two
fields. Theories in the social sciences can affect reality
while  theories  in  the  natural  sciences  cannot.  For
example,  if  people  believe  the  theory  that  abruptly
ending quantitative easing will cause the stock market
to crash, this could lead to a panicked sale of stocks,
triggering a crash. Eminent  mathematical  economist
Georgescu-Roegen  argued  that  the  mathematical
models  of  neoclassical  economics—explicitly  drawn
from  the  methods  of  mechanical  physics—are  ill-
suited for the modeling the qualitative change charac-
teristic  of  steadily  evolving  economies  [8].  Further-
more, though many physicist believe that if we knew
the position and velocity of all particles in the universe
it would be possible to retrodict the past and predict
the  future,  and  some  biologists  believe  that  genes
determine  behavior,  the  economy  should  not  be
described as a mechanistic system devoid of purpose
and will,  which  leaves  no room for  policy  [9].  The
social sciences should be informed and shaped by, but
not reduced to, the natural sciences [10].
Consilience is also not a one-way street: economists
have long called for  the natural  sciences to become
more consilient with economics, complaining about the
arrogance of "some scientists in assuming that they are
competent to comment on the economic problems of
the environment without knowing any economics" [11].
Numerous economists have (correctly) pointed out that
limits-to-growth  theorists  since  the  time  of  Malthus
have  often  failed  to  account  for  role  of  the  price
mechanism and human ingenuity in alleviating resource
constraints (e.g. [12‒14]).
Economics—conventionally defined as the allocation
of scarce resources among alternative competing ends
—is a broad field,  characterized by many schools  of
thought with different degrees of influence, some of
which  have  paid  more  attention  to  consilience  than
others.  Ecological  and  biophysical  economics  for  ex-
ample explicitly strive for consilience with the natural
and social sciences [9, 15‒19], but these two fields are
rarely considered part of mainstream economics. It is in
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fact  a  bit  difficult  to  define  mainstream  economics
precisely.  An  entry  in  an  on-line  encyclopedia  of
economics states that "we are all neoclassicals now…
what  is  taught  to  students,  what  is  mainstream
economics, is neoclassical economics." [20]. Precisely
defining neoclassical economics is also difficult. Some
authors  identify  three  core  axioms:  economic  phe-
nomena  can  only  be  explained  as  the  result  of
individual actions; all  human behavior is  an effort to
maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences; and
equilibrium between supply and demand is the starting
point for analysis [21, 22]. Other central themes found
in  most  undergraduate  textbooks  include  the  as-
sumptions that humans are rational, self-interested and
insatiable,  everything  can  be  measured  in  monetary
terms  (monism),  and  preferences  are  exogenous;
furthermore, Knightian uncertainty (immeasurable risk)
is ignored, and the desirability of continuous economic
growth is taken for granted (e.g. [17, 23]).
In recent decades, serious theoretical and empirical
challenges to the core tenets of neoclassical economics
have shaken the field, and many economists argue that
mainstream economics is transitioning towards greater
consilience  with  the  natural  and  social  sciences.
Colander et al.  [24] argue that at "the edge" of the
mainstream,  leading  economists  are  incorporating
complexity theory, psychology, ecology and institutions
into  their  theories.  These  leaders  are  strongly  re-
spected by their more orthodox colleagues, resulting in
a  continual  evolution  of  the  mainstream.  However,
Colander et al. also acknowledge that the mainstream
economics of 15‒30 years ago (neoclassical economics)
is still taught to undergraduates. Hodgson speculates
that  institutional  and  evolutionary  economics  may
become the new mainstream [23].
This article focuses primarily on the state of consil-
ience  within  mainstream economics,  while  acknowl-
edging  the  fuzzy  boundaries  of  the  field.  At  one
extreme the article will address the material taught in
undergraduate  textbooks—hereafter  referred  to  as
orthodox  economics—  which  is  the  only  exposure
most people receive to economics and arguably the
most  influential  on  policy  decisions  [17].  As  Nobel
laureate and leading textbook author Paul Samuelson
stated "I  don't  care who writes  a  nation's  laws—or
crafts  its  advanced  treaties—if  I  can  write  its  eco-
nomics  textbooks"  [25].  At  the  other  extreme  this
article will address "the edge" of economics, and the
new ideas that may be filtering into the mainstream.
From the perspective of sustainability,  however,  The
most important area for consilience is in the advice
economists provide to policy makers.
Economics  is  conventionally  defined  as  the  al-
location  of  scarce  resources  among  alternative
competing ends. From this definition, it  follows that
two areas of consilience in economics are particularly
important. The first is the science of human behavior
(e.g. psychology, neuroscience, evolution, and so on),
which  is  relevant  to  both  the  ends  that  economic
activity should pursue and the institutions compatible
with  human  behavior.  The  second  is  the  natural
sciences, particularly physics and ecology, which are
most relevant to understanding the means required to
achieve  those  ends.  We  can  only  decide  how  to
allocate resources after  determining the appropriate
ends  and  human  compatibility  with  different
institutional arrangements, and the available means,
including their physical characteristics. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first
section  following  this  introduction  will  focus  on
consilience with the science of human behavior. Sub-
sections  focus  on rationality,  self-interest  and satia-
bility, followed by a discussion of the extent to which
consilience  has  occurred.  The  second  section  will
focus  on the  natural  sciences,  with  sub-sections  on
the laws of physics, and the laws of ecology, followed
by a discussion of consilience. The third section will
focus  on  the  implications  of  consilience  for  the
allocation problem, with subsections on the physical
characteristics  of  the  scarce  resources,  the  laws  of
economics, and how we should allocate.
2. Human Behavior, Ends and Institutions
Modern economics  arose  from utilitarian  philosophy,
which viewed the maximization of utility—the achieve-
ment  of  the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest
number—as a  moral  imperative  for  society  and  the
desired end of economic activity [26,27]. Since people
experience diminishing marginal  utility,  classical  util-
itarian philosophy seemed to call for a more equitable
distribution  of  resources.  Many  economists  argued
however that a major challenge to maximizing utility
was the difficulty or impossibility of objectively quan-
tifying utility or comparing utility between individuals.
On the  other  hand,  if  people  are  rational  they  will
prefer things that generate more utility to those that
generate less, and their willingness to pay for different
goods and services (including leisure and other non-
market  activities,  the  costs  of  which  can  be  inter-
preted as the income foregone by not working) will
reveal  their  preferences  [28].  There  is  no  need  to
directly  measure  utility.  This  result  led  mainstream
economics  to  redefine  utility  and  welfare  as  the
satisfaction  of  individual  preferences  or  tastes  as
revealed by willingness to pay [26, 29, 30]. Utility for
society in the current period is therefore maximized
when resources are allocated to those willing to pay
the most for  them, which also maximizes monetary
value for the economy as a whole. In the words of a
leading economist "the refusal of modern economists
to make "interpersonal comparisons of utility" means
in effect that they use wealth rather than happiness
as the criterion for an efficient allocation of resources"
([31]  p.  88).  By  "efficient",  Posner  means  Pareto
efficient (also known as Pareto optimal) in honor of
Vilfredo Pareto, a central figure in the development of
neoclassical economics.  Pareto efficiency is defined as
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a situation in which it is impossible to make at least
one individual better off without making another worse
off.  Under certain rigid assumptions, markets can be
shown  to  allocate  resources  in  a  Pareto  efficient
manner. The central desired end of economic activity in
mainstream  welfare  economics  is  Pareto  efficiency,
equivalent to the maximization of  monetary value or
economic surplus at any given point in time, brought
about by the satisfaction of individual preferences in a
market  economy.  Market  competition  however  leads
firms to sell their products at the lowest possible price
to  cover  their  factors  of  production,  eliminating
economic  profit.  The pursuit  of  profit  leads firms to
innovate,  so  that  consumers  can  obtain  more  and
better  products  at  a  lower  price  over  time.  Since  a
larger economy creates even more wealth, continuous
economic growth is another desired end.
These  conclusions  emerged  from  fairly  rigid  as-
sumptions about human behavior, including rationality,
self-interest,  and  insatiability.  They  also  rely  on  the
assumption  that  we  cannot  make  interpersonal
comparisons of utility. The following three sub-sections
will  examine  the  rapidly  accumulating  evidence  that
refutes  these  assumptions,  much  of  which  was
produced by economists at "the edge". The forth sub-
section  below  assesses  the  extent  to  which  this
evidence has affected mainstream economics.
2.1. Are People Rational?
The  behavioral  sciences,  including  behavioral  eco-
nomics  and  neuroscience,  have  done  the  most  to
challenge  the  notion  that  humans  are  perfectly
rational. The polymath Herbert Simon first popularized
the  ideas  of  "bounded  rationality"  and  "satisficing",
which recognized that humans have limited cognitive
capacity  and  limited  information,  and  under  these
circumstances must settle for satisfactory rather than
optimal  decisions  [32].  Tversky  and  Kahneman
showed in rigorous experiments that human decision-
making exhibits systematic biases. For example, most
people are risk averse, and weight losses more heavily
than  gains  of  equal  value.  One can frame a  single
problem in  a  way  that  emphasizes  either  losses  or
gains and affect the decision making process [33]. As
the title of two popular books emphasize, numerous
experiments have shown that people are "Predictably
Irrational" [34], and we can therefore use our know-
ledge of human behavior to "Nudge" [35] people in
desired directions. Economist Milton Friedman argued
that the test of a good theory is not its realism, but
rather  its  ability  to  generate  good predictions  [36];
the assumption of economic rationality fails this test.
Neuroscientists and evolutionists have dug deeper
into the origins of such seemingly 'irrational' behavior.
The  human  brain  has  three  quasi-independent
subsystems  with  different  functions  that  evolved  at
different times. Roughly speaking, the 'reptilian' part
of  the brain  is  responsible  for  many automatic  and
instinctual behaviors, the limbic system is responsible
for  emotions  and  related  behaviors,  and  the  more
recently  evolved  neo-cortex  is  responsible  for  logic,
abstract thought and planning for the future. People
use different parts of the brain to make different types
of decisions, and it is possible to frame a decision in
such a way that it elicits a different response initiated
in  a  different  part  of  the  brain  [37].  Furthermore,
"continuous  exposure  to  fixed  cultural  norms  (e.g.,
religious doctrines, political ideologies and disciplinary
paradigms) literally helps to shape the brain's synaptic
circuitry in quasi-fixed patterns that reflect and embed
those  experiences"  which  leads  people  to  reject
information  that  does  not  conform  to  their  pre-
existing beliefs [38]. In fact, certainty appears to be
more of an emotional state than the result of rational
thought  [39].  This  helps  explain  surveys  that  show
higher levels of education correlate with greater belief
in anthropogenic climate change in all groups in the
US except Republicans, where the inverse is true [40];
and that conservative white males, particularly those
with  high  self-reported  understanding  of  global
warming,  are  more  likely  to  deny  anthropogenic
climate change than other groups [41].
2.2. Are People Purely Self-Interested?
Convincing  challenges  to  the  notion  of  perfect  self-
interest come from a wide variety of fields, including
anthropology,  mathematical  biology,  behavioral  eco-
nomics,  neuroscience,  epidemiology  and  evolution.
Increasing  evidence  suggests  that  symbiotic  coop-
eration has played a critical role in major evolutionary
transitions,  including  the  emergence  of  eukaryotes
from  cooperating  groups  of  prokaryotes  and  multi-
cellular  life  from  cooperating  groups  of  unicellular
organisms [42, 43]. Cooperation and concern for others
is  ubiquitous  in  humans  and  likely  the  major  factor
contributing to humanity's success [44‒47]. Historically,
economists  used  the  theory  of  natural  selection  to
support their assumption of self-interest, arguing that
individuals  who  sacrificed  their  own  fitness  to  help
others  would be out-competed by selfish individuals,
thus purging altruism from the gene pool.  However,
mathematical  biology  has  confirmed  at  least  five
different paths through which cooperation can evolve:
direct  reciprocity,  indirect  reciprocity,  kin-selection,
spatial proximity, and group selection. The fact that all
five  occur  in  humans  makes  us  'Super  Cooperators'
[45].  Anthropologists  have  empirically  tested  various
theories of cooperation in modern communities, finding
significant  support  for  them [48],  while  evolutionists
have  tested  their  theories  of  cooperation  against
random  samples  from  the  anthropological  literature,
again finding significant support [49].
Perhaps the most interesting path to cooperation is
group  selection,  or  more  accurately  multi-level  se-
lection:  groups  with  more  altruistic  individuals  have
greater  reproductive  success  than  those  with  more
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selfish individuals, even though within a given group,
selfish  individuals  may be  more  fit  [44,  45,  49‒51].
This  results  in  a  population  that  can exhibit  a  wide
range  of  genetic  pre-dispositions  towards  pro-social
behavior, ranging from purely selfish to highly altruistic.
Many cooperative species ranging from slime molds to
guppies  and humans are  able  to  detect  and  punish
cheaters  and  favor  cooperators,  which  further  pro-
motes  cooperation  [49,  52].  The  need  to  identify
cheaters and cooperators may in fact have played an
important role in the evolution of human intelligence
[45, 53].
In  humans,  the  genetic  capacity  for  cooperation
has  been  supplemented  by  culture  in  a  co-evo-
lutionary process. Behavioral economists have devised
a series of games that show that people will sacrifice
their own welfare to help others even in anonymous
settings, and will  also sacrifice their own welfare in
order to punish selfish individuals. Such punishment
appears  to  be  a  social  mechanism  for  promoting
cooperation,  and  is  thus  known  as  altruistic  pun-
ishment  [54,  55].  Mathematical  models  show  that
altruistic  punishment,  including  the  punishment  of
non-punishers,  greatly  facilitates  the  emergence  of
cooperation and is often built into cultural norms [48,
56].  As  a  result,  different  cultures  exhibit  different
degrees of cooperation [45, 57].
Another interesting finding is that cooperative species
as varied as the prokaryote  Myxococcus xanthus [58]
and  the  eukaryote  Dictostelium  discoideum [52]
cooperate when resources are scarce, but not when they
are relatively abundant. This raises the interesting pos-
sibility  that  our  competitive  market  economy  is  only
viable in the presence of fossil fuels, which unleashed a
new era of unprecedented resource abundance.
Confirming  the  biogenetic  component  of  co-
operation, neuroscientists have drawn attention to the
neurotransmitter oxytocin and its kin, which are found
in all animals from fish to mammals. Oxytocin serves
as  a  hormone  that  stimulates  birth  contractions  in
mothers,  and  as  a  neurotransmitter  that  induces  a
strong  feeling  of  bonding.  When  people  engage  in
cooperative  activities,  their  oxytocin  levels  increase,
and administering aerosolized oxytocin increases the
likelihood of cooperation in experimental games [59,
60]. Oxytocin is also stimulated by sexual activity, and
induces sensations of well-being [61]. Perhaps blood
oxytocin levels are a more accurate measure of utility
than consumption!
Humans are capable of developing institutions that
lead  primarily  selfish  individuals  to  cooperate,  or
primarily cooperative individuals to be selfish [22, 62‒
65]. One particularly disturbing finding is that monetary
exchange may actually reduce cooperation by crowding
out intrinsic motivations [66, 67], and simply priming
people to think about money may make them more
self-interested [68].
A final challenge to the assumption of perfect self-
interest  is  the  compelling  study  by  epidemiologists
Wilkinson  and  Pickett.  Their  research  found  that
individuals  in  unequal  societies  experience  higher
levels of social and health problems then individuals in
more equal  societies,  regardless  of  overall  levels  of
income. In fact, wealthy individuals may be worse off
in unequal societies than lower income individuals in
more equal societies [69]. Humans appear to have an
innate concern for fairness [70].
Integrating these insights into economic analysis has
profound impacts. Many of the most serious problems
faced by society today, ranging from climate change to
developing  green  technologies,  can  be  modeled  as
prisoners'  dilemmas,  which  are  best  solved  through
cooperation [45, 71]. If people evolved to be highly co-
operative, if different economic institutions elicit different
degrees of cooperation, and if markets can elicit selfish
behavior, then it becomes obvious that we must explore
a variety of allocative mechanisms in addition to markets
[22, 72], such as strategies based on shared production
and  common  ownership  [71,  73‒77].  If  people  are
inherently  social,  then we  must  question  the  metho-
dological  individualism  that  underlies  most  micro-
economic  analysis.  If  people  care  about  fairness  and
equality, then just distribution may be more important
than Pareto efficiency.
2.3. Are People Insatiable?
The assumption of insatiability also fails to stand up to
the  scientific  evidence.  Perhaps  the  most  obvious
evidence  comes  from  anthropology.  Humans  were
nomadic  hunter-gatherers  for  at  least  95% of  their
history.  As hunting and gathering activities depleted
food supplies, tribes were forced to seek out new food
sources,  often  far  away.  Those  who  attempted  to
accumulate more than they could carry would starve
[78], so it is hard to envision an evolutionary advan-
tage to insatiability. Nomadic societies were also highly
egalitarian,  and  frequently  punished  individuals  who
took too large a share of available resources [49].
Why  then  are  people  in  general  so  willing  to
consume more? Chilean economist Max-Neef suggests
that  people  might  believe  (perhaps  convinced  by
advertisers)  that  consuming  a  certain  product  will
satisfy their need for freedom, affection, participation,
leisure and so on. When consuming the product fails
to  satisfy,  they  may  mistakenly  believe  that  they
simply  have  not  consumed  enough,  leading  to  a
feeling  of  insatiability  [79].  Another  problem  arises
with  positional  goods,  consumed  to  confer  status.
Status  is  a  relative  concept,  and  if  everyone's  con-
sumption  level  increases  equally,  then  status  is  un-
changed even as environmental impacts worsen [80].
Furthermore, as the rich increase their consumption of
status  goods,  everyone else  will  feel  worse  off,  and
people  may  make  important  sacrifices  of  their  own
well-being  in  other  areas  in  order  to  maintain  their
status [81‒84]. Humans are other-regarding in envy as
well as fairness.
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This evidence suggests that beyond a certain point,
ever-increasing  consumption,  especially  of  positional
goods,  may  provide  few  benefits  for  society,  while
imposing serious costs.
2.4. Is the Science of Human Behavior Affecting 
Mainstream and Orthodox Economics?
Economists at the edge of the mainstream (including
many not cited above) have conducted much of  the
research on human behavior that challenges rationality,
self-interest  and  satiability,  with  results  frequently
published  in  mainstream  journals  and  taught  in
graduate  programs.  By  these  criteria,  consilience  is
underway.
However,  while  an  increasing  number  of  under-
graduate textbooks mention  behavioral  economics,  it
has yet to change orthodox economics in any mean-
ingful way. Perhaps the most damning evidence here is
the  consistently  replicated  research  showing  that
relative to the general  population,  people who study
economics on average behave less cooperatively [85,
86]; prioritize profit  maximization over fairness [87];
are more corrupt [88]; and are more likely to free ride
[89].  Some  of  the  differences  are  based  on  pre-
selection (i.e. more selfish people are likely to study
economics) but some are based on indoctrination [90];
in either case this does not bode well for consilience
with  the  behavioral  sciences.  On  the  other  hand,
Bowles' [91] textbook accepts the science of human be-
havior and evolution as core principles, and may fore-
shadow a fundamental change in orthodox economics.
From the perspective of  sustainability,  consilience
matters  most  when  the  resulting  insights  are
incorporated into policy recommendations. Gowdy and
Erickson  (2005)  argue  that  despite  the  fact  that
"neoclassical theorists have by and large abandoned
economic  man  …the  policy  recommendations  of
economists are still  based on these outdated repre-
sentations of human behavior…(and continue) to offer
bad advice in dealing with some of the most pressing
environmental and social issues faced in the twenty-
first century". Gintis [92] concurs that "environmental
policies are generally based on a model of the human
actor  taken  from  neoclassical  economic  theory".
Focusing  specifically  on  the  problems  of  positional
goods, but equally relevant to other insights from the
science of human behavior, Frank [93] asks "why does
the  economics  profession  take  no account  of  these
concerns  when  formulating  economic  policy
recommendations?",  and  asserts  that  none  of  the
responses provide by his colleagues bear scrutiny.
One reason that many economists fail to accept the
insights  from behavioral  economics  is  the  assertion
that  choice  behavior  is  equivalent  to  welfare  by
definition,  in  which  case  it  simply  does  not  matter
how or why people make particular choices. From this
libertarian perspective, if we cannot make objective,
interpersonal  comparisons  of  utility,  then  the  only
objective goal is free choice (e.g. [29, 30]).
However,  when  economists  argue  for  the  satis-
faction of subjective preferences as a central goal of
economics, they fail to point out that markets weight
preferences by purchasing power. Many of the prob-
lems central to sustainability concern the allocation of
society's shared inheritance from nature. It is hardly
value-neutral  or  objective  to  assert  that  we  should
allocate based on the principle of one dollar, one vote
rather  than  one  person,  one  vote,  particularly  if
people care about fairness. Markets assign a weight of
zero to the preferences of the destitute, and system-
atically allocate resources towards the wealthy. This is
particularly troubling for resources that are essential
and  non-substitutable.  Take  food  as  an  example.
When the prices of grain more than doubled during
the food crisis of 2007 to 2008, rich countries such as
the USA saw negligible change in consumption; the
price  of  wheat  tripled,  yet  consumption  actually
increased [94]. The poorest countries in contrast saw
a  dramatic  surge  in  hunger  and  malnutrition  [95].
Unquestionably,  monetary  value  is  maximized  by
allocating food to an overfed rich person willing to pay
a high price rather than a malnourished and destitute
family who can afford to pay almost nothing, but it is
difficult to accept that this this is somehow optimal,
efficient  or  utility  maximizing.  In  fact,  markets
arguably allocate the marginal  calorie to those who
gained the least additional utility from its consumption
[96].  The  refusal  of  orthodox  economics  to  make
interpersonal  comparisons  of  utility  is  so  extreme
however that mainstream textbooks essentially deny
the distinction between wants and needs; to quote a
typical textbook, "the law of demand puts the concept
of  basic  human  'needs'  to  rest,  at  least  as  an
analytical  concept"  ([97]  p.  259).  Denying  physio-
logical needs is denying basic science.
If I prefer oranges and you prefer apples, it may be
impossible  to  determine if  the utility  I  receive from
oranges exceeds what you receive from apples, and
allocation based on willingness to pay seems perfectly
reasonable. However, to whom society decides to al-
locate resources required to satisfy physiological ne-
cessities is  an ethical  issue, not a question of  pref-
erences  [98,  99].  This  is  especially  true  if  those
resources are a gift from nature.
While science can tell us much about the desirable
ends of economic activity, which ends should be prior-
itized is ultimately an ethical  question. Science may
however  be  able  to  contribute  insights  into  ethical
issues. One hypothesis is that ethics is the result of
gene-culture  evolution  designed  to  promote  human
cooperation, and hence the survival of the species. Jot
down a list of five ethical behaviors and five unethical
behaviors. You are likely to find that ethical behaviors
put the group ahead of the individual, while unethical
behavior puts the individual ahead of the group. Most
religions similarly call for putting the group ahead of
the  individual  [50].  Consilience  with  either  the
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sciences  or  humanities  would  force  economists  to
reconsider  the  goal  of  maximizing  monetary  value,
particularly for essential resources.
3. What Do the Physical and Life Sciences Tell 
Us About Scarce Resources?
Consilience  with  the  social  sciences  and  humanities
would force mainstream economics to reconsider what
is  desirable;  consilience  with  the  physical  and  life
sciences would force it to reconsider what is possible.
Conventional  economics  emerged  at  a  time  when
natural  resources  were  vast  relative  to  human
demands. The recently unleashed power of fossil fuels
provided  access  to  previously  unavailable  mineral
resources and unprecedented quantities of renewable
resources. Surplus output allowed society to allocate
more  resources  towards  science,  and  technological
advances further enhanced humanity's resource base
[100].  Economists  came to  assume that  technology
could always find a substitute for any given resource,
to  the  point  that  they  could  safely  ignore  natural
resources and focus entirely on capital and labor as
the  scarce  means  of  production  [101].  When
economists  again  began  to  occasionally  incorporate
natural resources into their production functions in the
1970s, raw materials, capital and labor were treated
as substitutes, as though one could make more bread
from the same flour by adding more cooks and ovens
[102‒105]. Economists largely treated technology as
manna  from  heaven,  and  virtually  ignored  the
importance of cheap and abundant energy [106]. The
power  of  fossil  fuels  however  has  allowed  us  to
deplete  natural  capital  stocks  and  increase  waste
emissions  to  levels  that  diminish  the  ecosystem's
capacity to reproduce and to sustain critical functions.
Economics can no longer ignore the laws of physics
and ecology and the natural resource base on which
society and the economy depend [9, 18, 107].
3.1. The Laws of Physics
From the laws of physics we know that it is impossible
to  create  something  from  nothing.  All  economic
products  result  from  the  transformation  of  raw
materials  provided  by  nature.  Furthermore,  it  is
impossible  to  create  nothing  from  something.  All
human  made  products  break  down,  wear  out  and
eventually fall apart, returning to the environment as
waste.  The extraction  of  raw materials  from nature
and  the  return  of  disordered  waste  are  known  as
throughput. Simply maintaining existing capital stocks
in the face  of  entropy requires  continuous  flows of
throughput [108].
We also know from physics that the transformation
of  raw  material  inputs  into  economic  products  and
waste requires low entropy energy,  irreversibly  con-
verted through use into high entropy waste. Recycling
energy  without  net  energy  loss  is  impossible  [18,
109].  Finite stocks of fossil  fuels account for nearly
90% of all energy used for economic production. We
can use fossil fuels almost as fast as we like, but once
used they are gone forever. New technologies have
recently helped increase gross oil production, but with
increasingly  high  energy  costs  per  new  barrel  ex-
tracted,  hence  lower  net  energy and  higher  green-
house  gas  emissions  per  barrel  [110,  111].  The
renewable alternatives to fossil  fuel  are available  in
vast quantities, but most are highly diffuse, difficult to
capture, transport and store, and flow at a fixed rate
over time [107, 112]. Sustainability demands that we
deplete fossil fuel stocks no faster than we master the
technologies  required  to  bring  alternative  energy
sources on line [108].
Economists must account for at least three distinct
categories of factors of production, that are essentially
complements, not substitutes, and that have different
characteristics:  raw  materials,  capital,  and  energy.
Raw materials—which Aristotle called material  cause
and  Georgescu-Roegen  (1971)  dubbed  stock-flow
resources— are physically transformed into economic
products  at  a  rate  we  choose,  and  use  equals
depletion.  Capital  and  labor—which  Aristotle  called
efficient cause and Georgescu-Roegen (1971) dubbed
fund-service resources—transform raw materials into
products  that  benefit  humans  at  a  given  rate  over
time.  Fund-services  are  not  used  up  in  the  act  of
production,  but  rather  are  worn  out  and  must  be
maintained.  Fund-services  require  energy,  such  as
fossil fuels, food or sunshine. As an example, a bakery
requires flour, cooks, ovens and energy (food for the
cooks,  electricity  for  the  ovens).  Labor  and  capital,
both fund-services, can substitute for each other, but
are complements to flour and energy. A more efficient
stove uses less energy, which could be construed as
substitution  at  the  margin,  but  once  maximum
efficiency  has  been  achieved,  no  additional  sub-
stitution is possible.
Finally,  the  most  basic  laws  of  physics  and
mathematics  tell  us  that  exponential  increases  in
efficiency  or  exponential  growth  of  any  physical
subsystem of a finite system can at best be transient
phenomena [113]. One dollar invested in the year 0
at 6% interest would now have the same value as a
ball  of  gold  (at  $1300  an  ounce)  filling  our  solar
system  to  the  orbit  of  Pluto.  The  economy  is  a
physical system, and cannot grow indefinitely.
3.2. The Laws of Ecology
The laws of ecology are almost certainly more tightly
binding on economic activity than the laws of physics,
though  often  far  less  understood. Many  of  the  raw
materials (stock-flow resources) physically transformed
into  economic  products  alternatively  serve  as  the
structural  building  blocks  of  ecosystems  (funds  that
generate a service). Society can largely determine how
fast to deplete available raw material stocks, such as
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trees  in  a  forest.  A  particular  configuration  of  eco-
system  structure  creates  an  ecosystem  fund  that
generates a flux of services over time. The ecosystem
fund is not physically transformed into the services it
provides (e.g. a forested watershed is not transformed
into  flood  regulation),  but  humans  have  little  direct
control  over  the  rate  at  which  these  services  are
provided (a given hectare of forest can absorb only so
much  water  per  day).  When  ecosystem structure  is
removed and waste returned, often in novel forms to
which  ecosystems  have  not  had  an  opportunity  to
adapt, ecosystem functions are affected: remove the
trees or kill them with acid rain, and rain water rapidly
flows  over  compacted  soil  into  the  adjacent  river,
causing flooding downstream. Many of these services
are essential to sustaining life, including the capacity
for ecosystems to regenerate [114, 115].
Ecosystems exhibit  the non-linearity,  positive and
negative  feedback  loops,  surprises  and  emergent
behavior  characteristic  of  complex  systems  [116].
They are also poorly understood, so we rarely know in
advance the long (or even short) term impacts of our
activities  [117,  118].  Many  ecosystem  services  are
characterized  by  critical  thresholds,  beyond  which
they will flip into entirely different states, potentially
far less amenable to the survival of humans and other
species,  and  this  may  hold  true  for  the  global
ecosystem as well.  In most cases, we do not know
where thresholds lie, nor do we know precisely what
will happen if we exceed them [119, 120].
One  of  the  major  challenges  in  economics  is  to
determine how much ecosystem structure should be
converted into economic products, and how much left
intact to generate ecosystem services. Two basic laws
apply. First,  humans cannot degrade or deplete any
element of ecosystem structure (e.g. fish, forests, or
fresh  water)  faster  than  it  can  regenerate  without
eventually crossing some threshold beyond which that
component  of  the  structure  is  gone,  or  else  the
ecosystem itself crosses an irreversible threshold, with
often  unpredictable  but  potentially  catastrophic
results.  Enough  structure  must  be  left  intact  to
maintain the flux of ecosystem services upon which
humans and other species depend. Second, humans
cannot  emit  waste  into  any  finite  system  at  rates
greater than it is absorbed, or else waste stocks will
accumulate,  eventually  harming  humans  and/or  the
ecosystem  in  potentially  catastrophic  ways.  Unfor-
tunately,  failure  to  acknowledge  the  central  impor-
tance of the life sciences to the field of economics has
led us to surpass these limits [121]. It is now essential
to  reduce  resource  extraction  below  regeneration
rates  and  waste  emissions  below  absorption  rates
until  stocks  are  restored  to  levels  compatible  with
ecosystem resilience and the continued provision of
ecosystem  services.  The  longer  we  take  to  accept
ecological limits to economic production, the greater
the reductions required.
3.3. Are the Sciences of Physics and Ecology Affecting
Mainstream and Orthodox Economics?
To achieve consilience with the physical and ecological
sciences,  economists  must  place  energy,  natural
resources  and waste at  the  core of  their  discipline,
and distinguish between fund-service (labor,  capital,
ecosystems) and stock flow (raw materials) resources.
Economists must recognize that converting ecosystem
structure into economic products and emitting wastes
inevitably  degrades  ecosystem functions  and accept
the urgent need to limit throughput to levels that do
not threaten life support functions of ecosystems. The
implications  of  these  changes  for  sustainability  are
obvious,  but  do  not  stop  there.  One  reason  that
economists pay little attention to distribution is that
their  models  show  that  factors  of  production  (in-
cluding  labor)  are  compensated  according  to  their
marginal product, which is considered fair. Including
either  natural  resources  or  energy  in  economic
production functions reveals that factors of production
(e.g. labor and capital) are not awarded according to
their marginal product [122‒124], which would force
economists  to  pay  more  attention  to  distribution.
Acknowledging  that  virtually  all  economic  activity
degrades ecosystem services inevitably leaving some
individuals  worse  off  would  force  economists  to
abandon the criterion of Pareto efficiency.
An increasing number of economists are acknowl-
edging  that  energy  is  an  essential  and  non-sub-
stitutable factor of production [18, 123, 125‒127], but
many simultaneously acknowledge that "[v]irtually all
of modern economic growth theory assumes that GDP
growth per capita is driven by technological progress
and  capital  investment,  including  knowledge  in-
vestment"  and  "does  not  take  into  account  energy
availability or prices" [122]. Similarly, many economists
recognize  that  nature  provides  essential  and  non-
substitutable benefits to humans while stressing that
mainstream economists assume endless substitutability
[19,  96,  128‒130].  The  emerging  field  of  degrowth
economics  recognizes  that  the  current  level  of  eco-
nomic  activity  already  overwhelms  planetary  bound-
aries  and  calls  for  economic  contraction  in  the  ag-
gregate to create ecological space for economic growth
in  the  poorest  countries.  Again  however,  these  eco-
nomists almost inevitably distinguish themselves from
the mainstream, where the goal of endless growth is
considered the norm [131‒134].
In the second update to Barnett and Morse's [12]
Scarcity and Growth, Simpson et al. [106] provide an
excellent summary of neoclassical  economists' treat-
ment of  natural  resources,  energy and the environ-
ment  as  it  has  evolved  over  time.  They  conclude
(though  do  not  necessarily  agree)  that  "majority
opinion is that even in relatively short periods—years,
even  months—substitution  possibilities  obviate  re-
source scarcity" ([106] p. 6). The justification for this
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belief  is  that  scarcity  leads  to  a  price  increase  that
creates  the  incentives  for  substitution,  efficiency,  or
developing new substitutes. Orthodox economists often
view technology as manna from heaven, which allows
economic growth to continue forever. For example, a
classic article by Solow [135] shows technology con-
tinuously increasing the efficiency with which we use
fossil fuels so that we can continue to produce just as
much from ever smaller quantities. Economists at least
recognize that many ecosystem goods and services are
public goods that generate no price signal—a market
failure  that  must  be  corrected  before  substitution  is
guaranteed. More modern growth models view tech-
nology as endogenous and also subject to numerous
market  failures,  but  in  general  still  conclude  that
endless growth is possible as long as suitable policies
ensure adequate investments in technology [136].
Of course, few economists are calling for continuous
physical  growth  of  the  economy,  but  rather  for  pro-
ducing more from less, arguing that "nobody can define
a  finite  absolute  minimum material  input  required  to
produce  a  unit  of  economic  welfare"  ([137]  p.  12).
However, just as one dollar grows exponentially in value
to equal  a ball  of  gold the size of  the solar  system,
continuous  exponential  growth  in  economic  welfare,
however measured, is  likely to be equally impossible,
and would eventually lead to a state of relentless bliss.
Economics is a huge field, and undeniably a growing
number  of  economists  are  integrating  ecology  and
physics into their  work,  for  example in the study of
ecosystem  services,  natural  resources  and  climate
change [138‒140]. What really matters however is the
extent  to  which this  translates into advice for  policy
makers and education for the next generation of eco-
nomists. The standard proxy for the size of the eco-
nomy, GDP, makes no adjustments for the depletion of
raw  materials  or  energy,  yet  most  economists  and
politicians alike call for its continuous growth, in spite
of  its  widely  recognized  flaws  [141,  142].  College
textbooks  in  mainstream  economics  largely  ignore
energy, and most focus entirely on labor and capital as
factors  of  production.  Some  textbooks  do  mention
natural resources, but invariably suggest that capital,
labor and technology are substitutes. Even more ad-
vanced courses in natural resource and environmental
economics generally  assume unlimited substitutability
between raw materials and capital and focus on contin-
uous economic growth. Most mainstream economists
focus on Pareto efficiency,  ignoring the fact that the
resource extraction, fossil fuel and waste emissions that
are the unavoidable consequences of economic activity
invariably have negative impacts on others.
4. Implications of Consilience for the Field of 
Economics
If economics achieved consilience with other sciences,
it would be forced to completely rethink the problem
of  allocation  both  within  and  between  generations.
How we should allocate depends on the desired ends,
the  physical  characteristics  and  status  (e.g.  abun-
dance or scarcity) of the available resources, human
behavior  and  existing  institutions.  Some  of  these
factors are dynamic to at least some extent, and as
they change, so too must the institutions and mech-
anisms required for allocation.
4.1. Physical Characteristics of Available Resources
Before describing how true consilience  would affect
economics, it is necessary to describe two important
characteristics of the available resources. The first is
known as excludability in economic jargon. A resource
is excludable if it is possible for one person or group
to use it  while  denying access to others. Access to
such resources can be rationed, which is necessary for
markets to exist. When a resource is non-excludable,
anyone who wants can use it,  and rationing is  im-
possible. Excludability is a policy variable that can be
implemented  to  different  degrees,  though some re-
sources,  including  many  ecosystem  services,  are
inherently  non-excludable.  It  would  for  example  be
impossible to ration access to a stable climate or the
ozone  layer's  ability  to  protect  us  from  ultraviolet
radiation.
Rivalry  is  another  important  characteristic.  A
resource is rival if use by one person leaves less for
others to use. All  stock-flow resources are rival.  For
example, if one person cuts down a tree to build a
house, that tree is no longer available for others to
use. Some fund-service resources are also rival.  For
example, the more of the waste absorption capacity
for greenhouse gas emissions used by the USA, the
less  is  available  for  other  nations.  When  global
emissions  exceed  absorption  capacity,  they  accu-
mulate as harmful atmospheric stocks. A resource is
non-rival if use by one person does not leave less for
others to use. If a forested watershed prevents dam-
aging  floods,  landslides  and  erosion,  the  benefits
captured by one person living in the regions affected
do not leave less for others to use. Only fund-services
can be non-rival.
Non-rival resources are not scarce in an economic
sense and there is therefore no need to compete for
them. In economic terms, abundant, rival resources are
similar to non-rival resources. For example, a towel on
a beach or a car on the road leaves less space available
for another towel or another car, which is the definition
of rivalry. However, when available space on the beach
or road is abundant, there is no competition for use,
and the resource appears to be non-rival. Road tolls,
beach entrance fees or other policies can ensure that
spaces  remain  abundant.  This  has  led  many
economists to argue that rivalry is a policy variable. In
fact, rivalry is a physical characteristic that cannot be
affected by policy [9]. No policy can change the fact
that burning a barrel of oil leaves less for others, or the
fact that additional people adopting a technology for
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energy efficiency does not reduce its effectiveness for
those who adopted it first.  Information is more than
just  non-rival:  it  actually  improves  with  use  [143].
Information is also essential for all economic production
and  must  play  an  important  role  in  addressing  our
current ecological crises.
4.2. The 'Laws' of Economics
Modern economics emerged at the end of the 18th
century,  when  natural  resources  were  relatively
abundant and per capita consumption of human made
goods and services a tiny fraction of what it is today
(Delong  [144]  estimates  that  real  global  GDP  per
capita has increased more than 30 fold since 1800).
Increasing the output of human made products was
arguably the best way to improve human welfare, and
markets an effective way to achieve this goal. Most
economists  therefore  focused  on  market  allocation.
The  market  price  mechanism  allocates  scarce  re-
sources  towards  the  products  that  add  the  most
monetary value then rations those products towards
the consumers willing to pay the most for them. The
rule for achieving this outcome is to keep producing
or  consuming  until  rising  marginal  costs  equal
diminishing  marginal  benefits.  The  logic  is  straight-
forward: when marginal benefits exceed marginal costs
then increasing consumption of a single commodity or
of  economic  production  as  a  whole  increases  total
utility.  However,  if  marginal  costs  exceed  marginal
benefits, then additional consumption makes us worse
off. Diminishing marginal utility, rising marginal costs,
and  the  equimarginal  principle  of  optimization  (i.e.
halting  consumption  when  MB=MC)  are  treated  as
basic laws of mainstream economics.
Mainstream  economics  generally  focuses  on
diminishing marginal utility for individual commodities:
the first 2000 calories you consume per day provide
far  greater  benefits  than the  next  2000.  The same
rule applies however for aggregate consumption. In
general,  people spend their first units of income on
basic  necessities,  such  as  food,  water,  shelter  and
clothing.  As  we  earn  more  income,  we  buy  in-
creasingly less essential commodities with increasingly
smaller  contributions  to  our  well-being.  This  means
there are diminishing marginal benefits to increasing
consumption,  and  hence  to  economic  growth.  The
marginal  costs  of  economic  growth  however  are
rising. As individuals in a competitive market, we pay
the same nominal  price for  each additional  unit we
consume. However, when we work to produce things
or earn money, we sacrifice the opportunity to engage
in other activities we might enjoy more. As we work
longer hours to earn more money, we must sacrifice
increasingly desirable alternative activities, so the real
cost  of  consumption rises.  At the same time,  if  we
accept the laws of physics and ecology, for any given
technology,  increasing  economic  production  requires
the  conversion  of  larger  quantities  of  raw materials
and  energy  into  economic  products  and  waste,
sacrificing more ecosystem services. Logically, society
will  sacrifice  the  least  important  ecosystems  and
services first, and must therefore sacrifice increasingly
important  services  with  increasing  production.
Eventually,  the  rising  ecological  costs  of  economic
growth will exceed the diminishing marginal benefits,
and  growth  becomes  uneconomic,  meaning  that  it
makes  us  worse  off  [145].  New  technologies  may
allow us  to  produce more  from less,  but  there  are
limits to efficiency improvements, and the inexorable
laws of exponential growth will  ultimately take over.
Furthermore, efficiency improvements often result in
greater resource use, not less, and the same is true
for economic growth [146].
Eventually,  as  we  convert  more  ecosystem
structure  into  economic  products  and  return  more
waste, we run the risk of crossing critical  ecological
thresholds and imposing unacceptable ecological costs
on society.  When we cross  a  threshold,  a  marginal
change in activity leads to a non-marginal change in
outcome. If the threshold involved leads to the loss of
an entire species or ecosystem, we must compare the
marginal benefits from the activity with the total value
of  the  species  or  ecosystem  that  is  lost  into  the
indefinite future [147]. Given the law of ecology that
everything is connected to everything else [148], the
total value may be unpredictable in advance, and may
not be realized for decades or even centuries [149].
Balancing marginal costs with marginal benefits is no
longer appropriate.
The central focus of an economics consilient with
laws  of  ecology  and  physics  should  no  longer  be
about  maximizing  the  monetary  value  of  market
goods and services. Rather, the first priority should be
to ensure that economic activity does not lead us to
cross  critical  ecological  thresholds,  ranging  from
nitrogen  emissions  to  biodiversity  loss  and  climate
change. With current technologies, this may be very
difficult.  For example, Rockstrom et al.  [2] estimate
that nitrogen emissions must be reduced by 70% if
we are  to  avoid  such thresholds,  while  greenhouse
gas  emissions  must  be  reduced  by  at  least  80%
[150]. With current technologies it is not obvious that
we can reduce emissions by that much and still feed 7
billion  people.  Major  investments  in  research  and
development in agriculture and clean energy will  be
required.  Even  when  safely  distant  from  critical
thresholds, economists should focus on ensuring that
the marginal ecological costs of economic activity do
not exceed the marginal benefits, even though direct
comparison of the costs and benefits may be difficult
or impossible.
4.3. Resource Characteristics and Allocation
Markets  are unlikely  to be a suitable mechanism for
achieving these economic goals. In the absence of ex-
cludability, anyone who wants can consume a resource
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whether or  not  they  pay,  and hence are unlikely  to
voluntarily pay in a competitive market or a in a culture
that  promotes  self-interest.  Ecosystem structure  and
mineral  resources  are  typically  excludable  under
existing institutions, and can easily be converted into
market commodities. However, the ecosystem services
lost from removing structure and emitting waste are
frequently non-excludable. Markets do not compensate
for their provision or penalize for their loss. The result
is over consumption, under-provision and degradation.
This dynamic explains anthropogenic climate change,
land use conversion, biodiversity loss, and most of the
other serious problems currently faced by society.
One solution is to make the resource excludable so
that it becomes possible to ration access. It is impos-
sible  to  make  services  such  as  climate  regulation,
disturbance regulation or protection from UV radiation
excludable, but it is generally possible to regulate or
make  excludable  the  activities  that  destroy  these
services.  However,  making  something  excludable
requires collective action via social institutions; it is a
prerequisite for market allocation, and not the result of
markets. If sustainability is a goal, then society must
step in to regulate access to ecosystem structure and
waste  absorption  capacity  to  ensure  the  adequate
provision  of  ecosystem  services.  Mainstream  eco-
nomists often argue that simply establishing tradable
private  property  rights  will  automatically  lead  to
efficient  allocation,  so  who  receives  those  rights  is
relatively unimportant [151, 152]. However, as we saw
above with the case of food, market allocation often
forces  those  with  the  greatest  level  of  physiological
need for a resource to reduce consumption the most. If
we limit land use change, biodiversity loss, freshwater
and  nitrogen  to  ecologically  sustainable  levels,  food
prices  will  likely  skyrocket  and  the  poor  will  starve,
which is not socially sustainable. If humans do indeed
care about fairness and the well-being of others, then
price-rationing of essential resources—especially those
freely  provided  by  nature—is  inappropriate.  Delib-
erative  democratic  processes  give  equal  weight  to
everyone's  preferences,  while  markets  weight
preferences  by  purchasing  power.  Which  of  these
approaches to use is about the distribution of power.
Furthermore, ubiquitous externalities rule out Pareto
efficiency  as  a  useful  criterion,  since  virtually  all
economic activities have negative impacts on others.
But rationing access is not always a solution. Non-
rival  resources  are  not  depleted  through  use,  and
rationing  access  therefore  reduces  benefits  without
affecting costs. Such resources are not scarce in an
economic sense, as there is no need to compete for
them once they exist—though there is competition for
any rival resources that might be required to produce
or protect them. Markets are only efficient (i.e. able to
balance  marginal  costs  with  marginal  benefits)  for
resources that are rival.  Paradoxically,  the economic
surplus (the monetary value of  total  benefits minus
total costs) from non-rival resources is maximized at a
price of zero where anyone who wants can consume
the  resource.  This  is  especially  true  for  clean
technologies that replace polluting ones. However, at
a price of zero, market supply is also zero. Economic
systems  must  still  allocate  resources  towards  the
production  or  protection  of  non-rival  resources.
Private  property  rights  to  non-rival  resources,  (e.g.
patents)  provide  market  incentives  to  supply  them,
but simultaneously reduce the economic surplus they
generate.  The  appropriate  allocation  mechanism  is
some  form  of  cooperative  (e.g.  publicly  financed)
provision that rewards innovators while making their
innovations freely available [71, 153].
Many  of  society's  most  important  resources,
ranging from global climate stability and clean energy
technologies (information) to biodiversity and critical
ecosystem services, are non-rival and inherently non-
scarce, challenging the very definition of economics.
Most  of  these  resources  are  also  inherently  non-
excludable so that rationing access is also impossible.
However,  global  society  has  been  strengthening
intellectual property rights for decades, using prices to
ration access to many of the technologies required to
solve our global problems [154]. For example, if we
develop a clean, efficient, decentralized form of solar
energy, no matter how much solar energy one country
captures,  there  will  be  no less  for  others,  and  the
technology  itself  is  likely  to  improve  through  use.
Patenting  the  technology  and  charging  for  it  will
reduce  use  and  hence  the  potential  for  reducing
climate change [71].
If  people  were  inherently  self-interested  and
competitive,  as  typically  modeled  by  orthodox  eco-
nomists, then we would be forced to rely on economic
institutions  that  channel  that  behavior  towards  the
common good, such as markets.  Behavioral  sciences
however show that humans are capable of cooperation,
and  can  build  institutions  that  enhance  our  innate
propensity for pro-social behavior. As discussed above,
markets may actually undermine cooperation.
 If economists hope to contribute to sustainability
science,  they  must  take  a  scientific  approach  to
economics that builds on insights from the physical,
life,  and  social  sciences.  Objective  physical  charac-
teristics of resources, not ideology, determine whether
competitive or cooperative allocation is most efficient.
Table  1  briefly  describes  potentially  suitable  mech-
anisms  for  allocating  different  types  of  resources.
While versions of this table are fairly standard in the
economic literature, most economists treat problems
resulting  from  non-excludability  and  non-rivalry  as
market  failures,  externalities  that  should  be  inter-
nalized through market prices. An economics that was
more consilient with advances in  other fields  would
instead recognize that economic activity unavoidably
degrades the environment, environmental degradation
is one of the greatest threats to human welfare, and
most  environmental  problems  take  the  form  of
prisoners' dilemmas that can only be solved through
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cooperation.  Economics  should  therefore  strive  to
develop the cooperative institutions required to solve
these  problems,  and  abandon  its  obsession  with
private property and markets.
Table 1. Resource Characteristics and their Implications for Allocation.
Excludable Non-excludable
Rival and scarce Potential market goods, e.g food, oil, 
land, consumer goods, but with 
inevitable negative externalities, ruling 
out Pareto efficiency as a decision tool.
Rationing is desirable, but price 
rationing of essential resources is 
problematic.
Open access regimes e.g. absorption 
capacity for greenhouse gasses; 
oceanic fisheries: rationing is 
desirable, but requires cooperation and
collective action.
Rival and 
abundant
(club or toll 
goods)
Club or Toll goods e.g. beaches, parks:
rationing desirable when scarcity is a 
threat.
Rationing is desirable when scarcity is 
a threat, but requires cooperation and 
collective action.
Non-rival Tragedy of the non-commons e.g. 
patented green technologies:
rationing undesirable. Open access is 
more efficient, but requires 
cooperation and collective action.
Public goods/open access resources 
e.g. climate regulation, flood 
regulation, open source information: 
rationing undesirable and impossible. 
Cooperative provision is essential.
4.4. Conclusions
There is little question that the discipline of economics is
in a rapid state of flux. Leading economists at the edge
of the mainstream are undoubtedly incorporating ideas
from  the  science  of  human  behavior,  physics  and
ecology, and these are slowly filtering down into the
mainstream. Even ideas from decidedly non-mainstream
fields such as ecological and biophysical economics are
becoming  more  widely  accepted.  Consilience  is  oc-
curring. Unfortunately, there is less evidence that the
sciences  are  having  much  impact  on  the  economic
orthodoxy, which is widely taught to undergraduates, or
on the advice given to policy makers. Perhaps this is to
be expected however, as academic disciplines tend to
evolve slowly.
At the same time however, the economic system is
also in an extremely rapid state of flux, and its impacts
on global ecosystems are unfolding at an unprecedented
pace. Since the 1950s, the human population has more
than  doubled,  the  use  of  petroleum  has  nearly
quadrupled, and economic activity has increased by a
factor of fifteen. Ecological impacts have increased at
the same pace [1]. Economists can no longer afford to
ignore basic principles of ecology and physics. Solving
these problems will  require new economic institutions
based  on cooperation,  and  such institutions  must  be
based on detailed knowledge of human behavior. A few
decades ago, stocks were long-term investments held
for years. Today, they are held for seconds [155, 156].
Foreign  currency  transactions  used  to  be  strictly
regulated.  Today,  annual  transactions  are  more  than
twenty  times  global  GDP [157].  In  complex  systems,
such rapid  and  powerful  changes  can  have profound
impacts,  such  as  the  financial  crisis  of  2008,  which
caught  most  economists  completely  unaware.  The
financial crisis undoubtedly pales in comparison to the
more slowly unwinding ecological crises we now face.
Economists can no longer afford to ignore the fact that
the ecological-economic system is a complex, adaptive
system subject to surprise and emergent behavior.
Economic theory must evolve at least as fast as the
economic system if it is to help society face 21st century
challenges. When unfolding events falsify theories from
mainstream  and  orthodox  economics,  those  theories
must be abandoned. We cannot passively await progress
at  the  edge  of  economics  to  filter  through  to
practitioners  and  textbooks  over  coming  decades.
Consilience  must  be  aggressively  pursued  as  a  core
principle of economic theory.
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